

# **Swedish Neutrality – Still Valid?**

**A MONOGRAPH**

**BY**

**Peter V. Adolfsson**

**LTC Swedish Army**



**School of Advanced Military Studies  
United States Army Command and General Staff College  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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A complete new set of challenges for Swedish security policy has been created by the fall of the Berlin Wall, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and Swedish membership in the European Union (EU), as well as in a number of other security policy organizations in Europe. The lack of a stable bipolar situation in Europe, combined with aspirations within the EU to move into the area of common security and foreign policy, provides the basis for the monograph to pose the question as to whether Sweden's official policy of non-alignment in peace aiming at neutrality in war is still credible. The monograph initially describes the European Union, the Western European Union, the Partnership for Peace, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as Swedish participation in them. Further discussion describes the concepts of non-alignment and neutrality and how those notions have been developed and formulated in Swedish security policy. The monograph concludes that the concept of non-alignment has little relevance in the 2001 European security environment. The situation is due to the lack of credible threat of major armed conflict, to the increased integration of Sweden into European affairs mainly through membership in the European Union, and finally to the recent dramatic reduction of Swedish military assets. The main sources of information for the monograph have been official documentation from the featured organizations, official Swedish government documentation, and contemporary Swedish and international press.

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## *Abstract*

Swedish Neutrality – Still Valid?

By LTC Peter Adolfsson, Swedish Army. 47 pages.

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

*In Europe, our principal security-political goal is to permanently ensure cooperation of close trust between all states. This is in line with our conviction that Sweden's security must be based to a considerable degree on mutual security grounded in stable political and economic relations between democratic states. It is a fundamental Swedish interest that developments in Central and Eastern Europe may also lead to deepened democratic culture and to economic and social progress, an improved environment and increased openness towards the surrounding world.<sup>1</sup>*

—1996 Swedish Resolution on Defence.

Traditional Swedish security policy has a long history of military non-involvement and of neutrality in case of war in the Nordic Region. The roots of this policy can be traced back to the early 19<sup>th</sup> century when Sweden's present borders were established. The real foundation for Swedish security policy pursued up until the early 1990's came from the experiences of World War II.<sup>2</sup> By walking a very narrow path of neutrality and by making some concessions, primarily to the Germans, Sweden managed to stay out of World War II. After the war, Sweden attempted to form a Nordic Defence alliance.<sup>3</sup> When that effort failed, Sweden in 1949 returned to its traditional security policy consisting of the two pillars of neutrality and a strong defense<sup>4</sup>. The idea was to avoid

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<sup>1</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96:12 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1995).

<sup>2</sup> Nils Gylde'n, Sweden's security and defence policy (Stockholm: Ministry of Defence, 1994), 11.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., 13.

getting involved in a war, at least initially, by not being part of a peacetime military alliance and at the same time to have a military strong enough to deter direct aggression. During the Cold War, with its two dominant superpowers on opposite sides of Europe, this policy was easily explained and it made sense to the Swedish population.

Despite the neutrality policy, the ideological and cultural connection to Western Europe was not denied, nor was the possibility to engage in international matters. Sweden has always put great emphasis on the importance of the United Nations (UN) and has been actively engaged in numerous peacekeeping operations as well as disarmament and non-proliferation matters.<sup>5</sup>

A number of events have significantly influenced the Swedish security policy since the early 1990's. The first and most obvious one was the fall of the Berlin Wall. There are no longer any military forces in Sweden's immediate vicinity capable of posing any threat of invasion against Sweden. The second significant event is the Swedish membership in the European Union (EU). EU membership has caused Sweden to take a broader view in its security policy even though the EU, until recently, has not been primarily concerned with matters of security policy.<sup>6</sup> Finally, Swedish membership in Partnership for Peace (PfP) and status as observer in the Western European Union (WEU) has opened new avenues of approach to active Swedish participation in different security building measures. Despite these changes the basic official Swedish policy of military non-alignment is still in effect.

Given the deepened cooperation within several of the above mentioned organizations and a rather dramatic decrease of Swedish military capabilities, the obvious question

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., 26.

<sup>6</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Om kriget kommit.... (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1994).

becomes whether Sweden's official policy of non-alignment in peace aiming at neutrality in war is still credible.

The monograph will briefly describe the most significant European security organizations and Swedish participation in them. The paper will then discuss the concepts of neutrality and non-alignment and describe the recent developments of Swedish security and defense policy. In the concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to answer the question as to whether increased cooperation in different security policy organizations in Europe is consistent with the Swedish policy of non-alignment.

## Chapter 2

### The European Union (EU)

*Our security policy has both a national and an international dimension.*<sup>7</sup>

—1999/2000 Resolution on Defence

#### The European Union, a Background

The European Coal and Steel Community (ESCS) was created by a treaty signed in Paris on 18 April 1951 to pool the steel and coal production of the six original members: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It was seen as a first step towards a united Europe. The European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) were established by separate treaties signed in Rome in 1957, the former to create a common market and to approximate economic policies, the latter to promote growth in nuclear industries. The common institutions of the three Communities were established by a treaty signed in Brussels in 1965.<sup>8</sup>

The EEC was formally changed to the European Community (EC) under the treaty of the European Union (The Maastricht Treaty), effective from 1 November 1993, although in practice the term EC had been used for several years to describe the three Communities together. The new treaty established a European Union (EU), which

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<sup>7</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> The Europa World Yearbook, 2000 ed., s.v. “European Union.”

introduced the concept of possessing European citizenship in addition to national, and aimed to increase intergovernmental co-operation in economic and monetary affairs, to establish a common foreign and security policy, and to introduce co-operation in justice and home affairs.<sup>9</sup>

As of the time of writing, the EU comprises the following fifteen nations:

**Table 1: EU Membership Nations<sup>10</sup>**

<b>Nation</b>	<b>Joined in</b>	<b>Nation</b>	<b>Joined in</b>
Austria	1 January 1995	Italy	25 July 1952
Belgium	25 July 1952	Luxembourg	25 July 1952
Denmark	1 January 1973	Netherlands	25 July 1952
Finland	1 January 1995	Portugal	1 January 1986
France	25 July 1952	Spain	1 January 1986
Germany	25 July 1952	Sweden	1 January 1995
Greece	1 January 1981	United Kingdom	1 January 1973
Ireland	1 January 1973		

Negotiations concerning future membership status are ongoing with Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus. Preparations for preliminary negotiations are proceeding with Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania.

## **Organizational Structure**

The European Union is built on an institutional system which is the only one of its kind in the world. EU member states delegate sovereignty for certain matters to independent institutions which represent the interests of the Union as a whole, its member countries and their citizens. The EU is governed by the European Commission, which traditionally upholds the interests of the Union as a whole, while each national

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

government has representation within the Council of the European Union. As part of the EU system of checks and balances, the European Parliament is directly elected by the EU citizens. The "institutional triangle" of Commission, Council and Parliament, is flanked by two other institutions: the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. Following is a description of the five bodies governing the EU.

### The European Commission

The European Commission embodies and upholds the general interests of the EU. The President and Members of the Commission are appointed by the member states after they have been approved by the European Parliament. The Commission is the driving force in the Union's institutional system. It has the right to initiate draft legislation and therefore presents legislative proposals to Parliament and to the Council. It also acts as the Union's executive body and is responsible for implementing the European legislation (directives, regulations, decisions), budget and programs adopted by the Parliament and the Council. Finally, the Commission represents the EU on the international stage and negotiates international agreements, chiefly in the field of trade and cooperation.

### The Council of the European Union

The Council is the EU's legislative and main decision-making body where member state representatives come together regularly at the ministerial level. The Council will be organized depending on what matters appear on the agenda: foreign affairs, finance, education, telecommunications, etc.

### European Parliament

Elected every five years by direct universal suffrage, with all major political parties operating in the Member States being represented, the European Parliament has three essential functions:

- share with the Council the power to legislate,
- share budgetary authority with the Council,
- exercise democratic supervision over the Commission.

### The Court of Justice

The Court of Justice ensures that EU law is uniformly interpreted and effectively applied. It has jurisdiction in disputes involving member states as well as EU institutions, businesses and individual citizens.

### The Court of Auditors

The Court of Auditors checks that all EU revenue has been received and all its expenditure incurred in a lawful and standard manner. It ensures that financial management of the EU budget has been sound.

Five additional bodies complete the European Union organization: the European Central Bank, the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions, the European Investment Bank (EIB), and finally the European Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is to whom all individuals or entities (institutions or businesses) resident in the EU can apply if they consider themselves being harmed by an act of "maladministration" by any EU institution or body.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> The European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy; available from <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/homeen.htm>; Internet, accessed 25 October 2000.



## **Current Security Policy Relevance**

As mentioned above, the Maastricht Treaty gave the EC/EU a security policy dimension that had not been present before. For almost forty years of European construction the very expression “common foreign policy” remained taboo. Although the EU member states endeavored to cooperate on major international policy problems, they never incorporated in any treaty the objective of a “common foreign policy”, until Maastricht created the EU.

### The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

The Maastricht treaty provides the EU with a common security policy CFSP that covers all matters relating to European security, including the gradual formation of a common defense policy. This common defense policy could eventually lead to a common defense should the Council of the EU so decide and should the decision be adopted and ratified by the fifteen member states.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, provision is made for fostering closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view towards its possible entry into the EU, should the Council so decide.<sup>13</sup>

The CFSP is governed by the provisions of Title V of the Treaty on European Union. Title V constitutes a separate pillar of the EU, since its mode of operation and its inter-governmental nature distinguishes it from the traditional pillars of the EU, such as the single market and trade policy. The difference is most striking in the decision-making procedures which require member state consensus, whereas in traditional areas a majority

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<sup>12</sup> The Council of the European Union and the Common Foreign and Security Policy; available from <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19020.htm>; Internet; accessed 27 December 2000.

<sup>13</sup> The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide; available from <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2000.

vote suffices.<sup>14</sup> In the first years after its introduction, joint action by member states under Title V were not as successful as they might have hoped. It was against this relatively unsatisfactory background that the provisions of the CFSP were revised by the Amsterdam Treaty, which was signed on 2 October 1997 and became effective on 1 May 1999.

The CFSP's capacity for action has been reinforced through the introduction of more coherent instruments and more efficient decision-making procedures. It is now possible to adopt measures by a qualified majority vote, with the dual safeguards of "constructive abstention"<sup>15</sup> and the possibility of referring a decision to the European Council if a member state resorts to a veto. There is, however, a safeguard clause enabling member states to block majority voting for important reasons of national policy. In such cases, when the member state concerned has stated its reasons, the Council of the EU may decide by qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for unanimous decision by heads of state and government.<sup>16</sup>

Another important change is the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP, which should make it possible to improve the effectiveness and the impact of the policy. The role of the High Representative is to assist the Council in CFSP-related matters by contributing to the formulation, preparation, and implementation of decisions. At the request of the Presidency of the Commission, the High Representative acts on behalf of

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> A constructive abstention is one which does not block the adoption of the decision. If the member state qualifies the abstention by a formal declaration, it is not obliged to apply the decision; but it must accept, in spirit of solidarity, that the decision commits the EU as a whole and must agree to abstain from any action that might conflict with the EU's actions under that decision. This mechanism does not apply if the member states abstaining in this way account for more than one third of Council votes.

<sup>16</sup> The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide; available from <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm>; Internet: accessed 15 January 2001.

the Council in conducting political dialogue with third parties. It is worth noting that the current High Representative is Mr. Javier Solana, former NATO Chairman and present chairman of WEU.<sup>17</sup>

### The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit<sup>18</sup>

One of the most important aspects of the coherence of the CFSP is how member states react to international developments. Past experience has shown that if reactions are uncoordinated, the position of the EU and its member states on the international scene is weakened. Joint and combined analysis of international issues and their impact, along with the pooling of information, should help the EU produce effective reactions to international developments. With this as a background, it was agreed in a declaration annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam to establish a unit designed for policy planning and early warning. The unit operates in support of the General Secretariat of the Council under the authority of the High Representative for the CFSP. Composed of specialists drawn from the General Secretariat, the member states, the Commission and the WEU, its tasks include:

- Monitoring and analyzing developments in areas relevant to the CFSP;
- Providing assessments of the Union's foreign and security policy interests and identifying future areas of focus for the CFSP;
- Providing timely assessments and early warning of events, potential political crises, and situations that might have significant repercussions on the CFSP;
- Producing, either on its own initiative or at the request of either the Council or the Presidency, reasoned policy option papers for the Council.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit is eventually to become a part of The European Union Military Staff (EUMS) as described below.

<sup>19</sup> The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide; available from <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm>; Internet; accessed 15 January 2001.

## **The European Union Military Structures**

In Helsinki in December, 1999, the European Council set a high goal for EU military capabilities. The aim is to be able by 2003 to deploy military forces of from 50,000-60,000 persons within sixty days of notification and sustain them for at least one year in operations led by the EU. The forces will be capable of ensuring the so-called Petersberg tasks.<sup>20</sup>

To provide guidance and command and control to these forces, the following new permanent political and military bodies will be established within the Council:

- A standing Political and Security Committee (PSC)
- The Military Committee (EUMC)
- The Military Staff (EUMS)

As an interim measure, while the military structures are being formed, a body of military representatives of member state Chiefs of Defense has been established. It serves as a group within the Council of the EU, with the purpose of giving military advice as required to the interim political and security committee. The Council Secretariat has also been strengthened by military experts seconded from member states. Formed into the interim Military Staff, these experts assist in the development of the EU military capabilities and form the nucleus of the future EUMS. The interim Military Staff is composed of some twenty military experts and eight civilian secretaries and is currently growing towards a target figure of about forty-five. The work conducted since the establishment of the interim Military Staff has enabled the EU to define the variety of measures needed to successfully carry out the full range of military tasks. The needs

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<sup>20</sup> The Petersberg tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.

identified have been outlined in a capability catalogue. On November 20, 2000, in Brussels, the member states took part in a Capabilities Commitment Conference, making it possible to draw together the specific national commitments corresponding to the military capability goals set by the European Council held in Helsinki. In accordance with the guidelines on collective capability goals, the member states also committed themselves to medium and long-term efforts to improve both their operational and their strategic capabilities still further in an effort to fully achieve the 2003 goal.<sup>21</sup>

## **Summary**

At the time of writing, the EU is clearly an organization primarily focused on economic and social issues and the questions of enlargement. However, the questions of common security and defense policy have plainly been lifted more to the forefront with the Amsterdam Treaty. The ambition to create EU military capabilities can be described as a new chapter in the organization's history. Should the CFSP evolve in to a true common defense policy, Sweden's non-alignment policy will be overcome by events. The question then becomes whether Sweden views maintaining its non-alignment policy more important than keeping its EU membership.

In official Swedish comments on the implications of the Amsterdam Treaty security policy, the enhanced decision-making capability and the incorporation of Petersberg tasks are welcomed. The Swedish government states, however: "The new Treaty does not mean

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<sup>21</sup> The European Union Military Structures; available from <http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/EUMS.htm> Internet; accessed 20 January 2001.

a clear development towards a common defense, or towards an incorporation of the WEU into the EU.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Sverige och Amsterdamfördraget (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).

## **Chapter 3**

### **Western European Union (WEU)**

#### **The WEU, a Background**

Based on the Brussels Treaty of 1948, the Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1955. The organization led a quiet and not very prominent life until a meeting of ministers of defense and of foreign affairs decided to “reactivate” the organization by restructuring it and holding more frequent ministerial meetings. In 1987, the Council of the WEU adopted a document entitled “Platform on European Security Interests,” declaring its intention to develop a more cohesive European defense identity while affirming that the substantial presence of U.S. conventional and nuclear forces remained an important part of the defense of Europe.<sup>23</sup>

In 1990, the WEU started to develop contacts and hold consultations with the recently elected democratic governments of central and eastern Europe. The consultations focused on the security structure and political stability of Europe, on the future development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and on arms control and disarmament. In the area of arms control and disarmament, special emphasis was placed on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE

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<sup>23</sup> The Europa World Yearbook, 2000 ed., s.v. “Western European Union.”

Treaty) and on the “Open Skies” Treaty. The consultations resulted in nine eastern and central European nations being accorded status as associate members of the WEU in 1994.<sup>24</sup>

The Maastricht Treaty refers to the WEU as an integral part of the EU development and requests the WEU to elaborate and implement EU decisions and actions which have defense implications. A separate declaration, adopted by WEU member states in Maastricht, defined the WEU’s role as not only the defense component of the European Union, but also as the means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance under NATO.<sup>25</sup>

The WEU currently consists of 28 nations with different relationships to the organization:

**Table 2: WEU Nations<sup>26</sup>**

<b>Member States</b>	<b>Associate Members</b>	<b>Observers</b>	<b>Associate Partners</b>
Modified Brussels Treaty 1954	Rome 1992	Rome 1992	Kirchberg 1994
Belgium France Germany Greece (1995) Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal (1990) Spain (1990) United Kingdom	Czech Republic (1999) Hungary (1999) Iceland Norway Poland (1999) Turkey	Austria (1995) Denmark Finland (1995) Ireland Sweden (1995)	Bulgaria Estonia Latvia Lithuania Romania Slovakia Slovenia (1996)

### **Current Security Policy Relevance**

In the WEU Ministerial Declaration of July 22, 1997, responding to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the WEU confirmed its readiness to develop relations with the EU and to

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> WEU nations; available from [www.weu.int/eng/info/members.htm](http://www.weu.int/eng/info/members.htm); Internet; accessed 21 January 2001.



work out arrangements for enhanced cooperation. The WEU and the EU have agreed on the practical arrangements for the participation of all EU member states in WEU operations undertaken in accordance with the Treaty on European Union. The agreement enhances the operational role of the observer nations (i.e. non-allied EU States) in the WEU. Following the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the WEU and the EU approved a set of arrangements for enhanced cooperation. These arrangements include:

- A practical guide to the coordination of EU/WEU consultation and decision-making, in particular in crisis situations ("modus operandi" and flowchart);
- Arrangements for the holding of joint meetings of the relevant bodies of the two organizations;
- The WEU Council decision to harmonize its sequence of rotating presidencies with that of the EU;
- Enhanced coordination between the WEU Secretariat-General and the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU;
- Arrangements to allow the EU (including the Policy Unit to which the WEU will send a representative) to draw on the resources of the WEU's Military Staff, Satellite Centre and Institute for Security Studies;
- The informal arrangements between the EU and the Western European Armament Group (WEAG) in the field of armaments cooperation;
- Cooperation with the European Commission;
- Security arrangements between the WEU Secretariat-General and the EU Council Secretariat, and between the WEU Secretariat-General and the Commission.<sup>27</sup>

In recent years, cooperation between the EU and the WEU has resulted in the WEU contributing a police contingent to the EU administration in Mostar, assisting in mine clearance in Croatia (WEU Demining Assistance Mission to Croatia-WEUDAM), and cooperating in planning for humanitarian and evacuation operations in support of peacekeeping efforts in Africa.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> WEU and the European Union; available from <http://www.weu.int/eng/info/eu.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2001.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

### Operational Capabilities

The WEU has developed the needed procedures and mechanisms for preparing, planning and conducting operations as well as ensuring their political control and strategic direction. These mechanisms include a military staff and a range of military and politico-military committees and working groups. The WEU has no assigned forces nor any permanent command structures. Military units and headquarters have been designated by the WEU nations that could be made available to the WEU on a case-by-case basis for specific operations. These "Forces answerable to WEU," or FAWEU, are tracked on a database maintained by the WEU military staff and are updated annually. In addition to national units, a number of multinational formations have been designated as FAWEU. The most significant of these forces are:

- The European Corps (EUROCORPS),
- The Multinational Division (Central),
- The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force,
- The Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR),
- The European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR),
- The Headquarters of the First German-Netherlands Corps,
- The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force, and
- The European Air Group (EAG).

On the basis of decisions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in January, 1994, and June, 1996, the WEU is now also able to request the use of NATO assets and capabilities, including Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs), for its operations.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Development of WEU's operational capabilities; available from <http://www.weu.int/eng/info/opcap.htm>; Internet; accessed 20 January 2001

## Summary

The WEU aspires to be an operational organization in the context of the other European security policy organizations. The WEU's most preferred option is probably that of being incorporated as the military branch of the EU, with the EU as the European pillar of NATO. Swedish commitment to, and view of, the WEU is clearly dependent on the future development of the organization. As of March, 2001, a Swedish policy of maintaining observer status seems sufficient. Official Swedish comments to the WEU stresses that it's operational capabilities are mainly aimed at Petersberg tasks, rather than focused on warfighting defense tasks. When it comes to the interaction between the EU and the WEU, Sweden, together with Finland, has strived to give rights commensurate with full membership to EU members that are WEU Observer nations when it comes to planning and decisionmaking in operational matters.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Redogörelse för verksamheten i Europeiska Unionen under 1998 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).

## **Chapter 4**

### **Partnership for Peace (PfP)**

#### **The Partnership for Peace, a Background**

With the fall of the Berlin wall and the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, NATO embarked on a program designed to prevent the reemergence of communism and to ensure closer relations with former Warsaw Pact members. The basis of this new program emerges from the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting in Rome in November 1991. In “The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept,” NATO recognizes the need for a new approach to the security situation in Europe.<sup>31</sup> The first practical result of this policy was an invitation to the foreign ministers of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Russia to join the NAC meeting in Brussels in December 1991. The purpose of the meeting was to form the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC).<sup>32</sup> The focus of the NACC was to enhance security and related issues such as defense planning, arms control, democratic concepts of civil-military relations, air traffic management, and the conversion of defense production to civilian purposes.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> NATO, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept (Rome: North Atlantic Council, 1991).

<sup>32</sup> NATO, Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation (Rome: North Atlantic Council, 1991), 4.

<sup>33</sup> NATO, North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement On Dialogue, Partnership And Cooperation (Brussels: NACC, 1991).

Following the formation of the NACC as a forum for political level cooperation, the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was created as the result of a U.S initiative. In January, 1994, NATO extended an invitation to states participating in the NACC and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to form the PfP. The objective of the organization was to provide a framework for more practical cooperation between the participating states. Partner states were invited to participate in political and military bodies at NATO Headquarters through permanent representation in the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC). The invitation also proposed peacekeeping exercises beginning in 1994, with participation from NATO and partner states, to promote closer military cooperation and interoperability.<sup>34</sup> By the end of 1994, twenty-three partner nations, including Sweden and Finland, had signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document (see appendix A).<sup>35</sup>

At the NACC Foreign Ministers meeting held in 1997 at Sintra, Portugal, the next step in the PfP evolution was taken by the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC was created as a successor to the NACC and was designed to give the PfP an expanded political dimension by providing an overarching framework for consultations among its members.<sup>36</sup> All twenty-seven partnership nations joined EAPC.

The most recent steps in developing the PfP were taken at the Washington Summit in April, 1999. In the report “The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership (EMOP),” the following initiatives were presented by the EAPC to enhance PfP capabilities:

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<sup>34</sup> NATO, Partnership for Peace: Invitation (Brussels: NATO Headquarters, 1994).

<sup>35</sup> Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework document, updated 1 December 1999; available from <http://www.nato.int/pfp/sig-cntr.htm>; Internet; accessed 23 January 2001.

<sup>36</sup> NATO, Basic Document of the EAPC (Brussels: NACC-EAPC, 1997).

- A politico-military framework for NATO-led PfP-operations;
- Deepened military and defense-related cooperation within the Partnership Work Programme;
- Further development of the Planning and Review Process (PARP);
- Introduction of Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP)
- Introduction of the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC).<sup>37</sup>

## **Current Security Policy Relevance**

To understand the relevance of these initiatives to the credibility of Swedish non-alignment policy, a brief explanation of each is illustrative.

### Politico-Military framework for NATO-led PfP-operations

This framework regulates partner nation involvement in the operational planning, in the command structure, and in the political consultations and decision making for NATO-led crisis management operations. The aim is to enhance the transparency and to increase the influence each partner nation is able to exercise on operations to which it contributes troops. Partner nations who declare they are willing to participate in an operation are able to obtain and share information about the operation as early and completely as possible. When NATO officially accepts a partner nation's potential contribution, consultations between NATO and the contributor take place. Although the partner nations have no decision or veto rights, they are supposed to participate in the decision-shaping process and decisions shall, if possible, be made in consensus.<sup>38</sup>

### Partnership Work Programme

The Partnership Work Programme (PWP) is a broad description of the various possible areas of cooperation with a listing of available activities for each area. The PWP covers a three-year period and is reviewed by NATO and partner nations every year.

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<sup>37</sup> Försvarmakten, Det fördjupade samarbetet inom ramen för PFF-bakgrund och utveckling (Stockholm: Högkvarteret, 2000).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

The areas of cooperation have differed slightly over the years, but the nucleus of the cooperation areas has stayed generally the same. Each one of the areas is supported by numerous activities sponsored by NATO civilian or military bodies and/or by the NATO or partner nations themselves. The PWP, containing nearly one thousand activities in 1997, serves as a “menu” of possibilities for Partners to incorporate in their Individual Partnership Programmes (IPP).<sup>39</sup>

#### Planning and Revue Process

In 1995, a Planning and Revue Process (PARP) was introduced within the PfP framework. The purpose of the PARP is to advance interoperability and increase transparency among the NATO nations and among the partner nations. The PARP is based on a biennial planning cycle modeled on the NATO defense planning system. Participation among Partners is voluntary, although the majority have chosen to join. The first and second PARP cycle focused on interoperability objectives aimed at facilitating PfP cooperation and potential future PfP operations. In the latest PARP, the development of partnership goals will offer a broader scope for cooperation<sup>40</sup>

#### Training and Education Enhancement Programme

The need for enhanced and more effective training and education is a natural result of the deepened Partnership Programme. At the Washington Summit in 1999, a new program was presented aimed at satisfying these needs. Called the Training and Education Enhancement Programme (TEEP), it aims to focus training and education towards enhanced interoperability in NATO-led peace support operations. The program

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<sup>39</sup> Försvarmakten, Det fördjupade samarbetet inom ramen för PFF-bakgrund och utveckling (Stockholm: Högkvarteret, 2000).

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

builds on initiatives as the creation of PfP Training Centers and on a network designed for computer simulated exercises, the PfP Simulation Network.<sup>41</sup>

### Operational Capabilities Concept

A central feature in the creation of a more operational PfP is the Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC). The initiative emphasizes improving the military effectiveness of NATO-led multinational forces. It aims to increase military cooperation to help the partners develop forces that are better able to operate with NATO forces in future crisis response operations.<sup>42</sup> The main elements within the OCC concept are:

- A roster of units available for participation in NATO-led peace support operations which identifies unit capabilities and potential development;
- Development of structures aimed at enhancing the cooperation between NATO and partner nation headquarters in peacetime. These structures are also aimed at supporting the implementation of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept;
- Evaluation and feedback mechanisms aimed at assessing the capabilities of units being offered to participate in NATO-led peace support operations.

The idea is to create a database of information on partner nation units and their capabilities that, through PARP or through their IPP, make them eligible to contribute to NATO-led operations. The concept also allows multinational forces created in peacetime to be added to the roster. The identified units are expected to regularly exercise and practice together and are evaluated according to the evaluation and feedback mechanisms mentioned above. The overarching purpose is to facilitate the creation of specific units for specific missions and to shorten the time it takes to get well-trained units to the area

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<sup>41</sup> Försvarsmakten, Det fördjupade samarbetet inom ramen för PFF-bakgrund och utveckling (Stockholm: Högkvarteret, 2000).

<sup>42</sup> NATO, Partnership for Peace-An Enhanced and more operational partnership (Brussels: SHAPE , 2000).



of operation. Completion of the database is expected towards the end of 2000, and the first exercises and evaluations are to take place during 2001.<sup>43</sup>

### The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Concept

The CJTF is a staff structure that complements NATO's permanent command structure. As the name implies, the purpose of the CJTF is to command and control a combined joint task force for a specified purpose for a limited time period. In time of crisis, the existing permanent CJTF Headquarters is to be augmented by officers from partner nations contributing forces to the operation.<sup>44</sup> The PfP political-military framework, together with the OCC and the CJTF, constitutes the basis for partner nation contribution of forces and capabilities to NATO-led PfP-operations.

## **Summary**

The PfP is in many ways a brilliant construction. It has resolved the security policy vacuum that emerged with the fall of the Berlin Wall without flooding NATO with new and, in some cases, unwanted members. It has also increased the interoperability between the nations in Europe and constructively facilitated NATO operations in the Balkans. In a way, it might be said that it competes with the EU and the WEU in providing an operational framework for European peace support operations.

The most essential features of the PfP from a Swedish perspective are the EAPC, the PARP and the PWP. The EAPC provides an important forum for regular consultation and cooperation at the political level, an important feature in helping the former Warsaw-Pact countries transform into modern states. With its purpose of advancing interoperability

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<sup>43</sup> Försvarsmakten, Det fördjupade samarbetet inom ramen för PFF-bakgrund och utveckling (Stockholm: Högkvarteret, 2000).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

and increasing transparency among NATO and partner nations, the PARP is key to creating interoperable and efficient peace support forces for future needs. Finally, the PWP, with its broad number of activities and areas of cooperation, is important both for enhanced interoperability as well as for increased understanding and confidence between partner nations. There seems to be no negative implications regarding Swedish participation in the PfP and its non-alignment policy, since the PfP strictly honors national decisions regarding participation in activities.

## Chapter 5

### Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

*According to Swedish views, international military crisis reaction missions should be conducted after decisions in the UN, or in the OSCE.*<sup>45</sup>

—Government report, Stockholm, 1997

#### The OSCE, a Background

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) was established in 1972 as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), providing a multilateral forum for dialogue and negotiation. It produced the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 on East-West relations. The areas of competence of the CSCE were expanded by the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 1990, which transformed the CSCE from an ad hoc forum to an organization with permanent institutions which produced the Helsinki Document in 1992. In December, 1994, the summit conference adopted the new name of OSCE, to reflect the organization's changing political role and strengthened secretariat. The OSCE has fifty-five participating states and comprises all the recognized countries of Europe, Canada, the United States, and all the former republics of the Soviet Union.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Euro-atlantiska partnerskapsrådet och det fördjupade Partnerskap för fredssamarbetet. (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1997).

<sup>46</sup> The Europa World Yearbook, 2000 ed., s.v. "Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe."

## Current Security Policy Relevance

The OSCE is the central, all-European instrument for conflict prevention, crisis management, and negotiations on disarmament in Europe.<sup>47</sup> All states participating in OSCE have equal status, and decisions are based on consensus. The organization is conducting a number of activities intended to prevent conflicts and enhance confidence between nations. Examples of these activities are the permanent institutions of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and the Representative on Freedom of the Media (FOM). In addition to these permanent institutions, the OSCE also provides a number of temporary activities aimed at certain nations or problem areas. Among these temporary activities are the implementation of the arms control and confidence and security-building measures in the Dayton Accords, and the supervision of a number of elections in the Balkans and in other areas in Europe.<sup>48</sup>

The OSCE also keeps field missions in a number of countries to help create stable conditions. In March, 2001, the OSCE had field missions deployed to Estonia, Latvia, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Croatia, Macedonia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbajdzjan, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabach, Moldova, Tjetjnia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The field missions deal with a variety of issues depending on the situation in the country. The field mission in Latvia, for example, is working to enhance the efficiency of the Latvian government in general. The mission in Estonia is monitoring the situation for

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<sup>47</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Euro-atlantiska partnerskapsrådet och det fördjupade Partnerskap för fred-samarbetet (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1997).

<sup>48</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Redogörelse för verksamheten inom Organisationen för säkerhet och samarbete i Europa (OSSE) under år 1998 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).

the Russian minority there, while the mission in Moldova is monitoring the political situation between Moldova and Russia.<sup>49</sup>

In the area of confidence-building the Vienna Document is key. The most current version, Vienna Document 99, is a development of the Vienna Document 94. The document regulates rights and obligations for OSCE member states concerning measures to increase transparency and confidence-building between nations. For example, it defines the right of a country to inspect the military installations of another, as well as the obligation to announce major military exercises in advance. Another important instrument in the confidence-building area is the Open Skies Treaty of 1992. The treaty gives the participating states the right to conduct flights over each other's territories to verify military conditions. The treaty is not yet in effect since not enough nations have ratified it.<sup>50</sup>

In the area of disarmament, the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (the CFE Treaty) is of the utmost importance. The original treaty was signed in 1990 and mirrored the bi-polar situation at the time. At the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, the new CFE Treaty was signed, better reflecting the current situation in Europe. The treaty is one of the cornerstones in European conventional arms control and has great importance for security and confidence-building. The treaty limits the number of tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, attack helicopters and combat aircraft that each country is allowed to have. It also provides a number of measures for transparency and opportunities for inspections.

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Redogörelse för verksamheten inom Organisationen för säkerhet och samarbete i Europa (OSSE) under år 1999 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2000).

Since the CFE-treaty originally was a treaty between NATO and the Warsaw-pact, Sweden is not a signatory of the original treaty, nor has she signed the new one. Sweden, however, welcomes it since it limits the military forces in the Nordic region.<sup>51</sup>

## **Summary**

The OSCE is an important part of the European security policy structure. Since all European nations are members, as well as Canada, the United States, and all former Soviet Republics, it is the only regional organization where truly all-encompassing European measures can be discussed and implemented. Sweden clearly recognizes the importance of the organization and actively supports it. In addition to the disarmament, security and confidence-building measures discussed above, the OSCE is also striving to increase its role in peace support operations. The OSCE is working to create a civilian rapid reaction force as well as improved police capabilities. Sweden is actively working for increased coordination between EU and the OSCE to enhance European crisis reaction capabilities.<sup>52</sup> There are no implications for Swedish neutrality or non-alignment due to membership in the OSCE since the organization has no aspirations for any common defense or security policy arrangements.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

## **Chapter 6**

### **Swedish Policy and Positions**

#### **The Concepts of Neutrality and Non-alignment**

Neutrality as a concept within the law of warfare has a long history. It was first recognized in the Declaration of Paris in 1856 and in the two Hague conventions (1907 and 1923) to protect smaller nations that wanted to stay out of European wars.<sup>53</sup> These conventions formalized a concept that had been alive since the ancient Greek city-states.

To be credible, and consequently effective, a policy of neutrality requires the neutral state to defend its rights and support its obligations. A declaration of neutrality in war gives the state the right to self-defense, to maintain its territorial integrity and to continue trade. It is also possible for a neutral state to offer safe haven for ships or planes in emergencies, even if the craft belong to one of the belligerents. These rights do not preclude self-expression and the freedom of the media. A neutral state may not cooperate with, or benefit from, any of the warring parties. In essence, the state must be impartial towards the belligerents.<sup>54</sup>

The policy of neutrality describes a relationship between nation states and is therefore only possible for a sovereign entity. The perceptions of neutral states and the

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<sup>53</sup> The New Encyclopedia Britannica, vol 8, 15<sup>th</sup> ed.,s.v. “neutrality” (Chicago, IL: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 1993).

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

surrounding states are the basis for neutrality. The neutral state makes the assumption that it is possible to stay out of potential or actual conflict. If war would immediately involve the neutral state, the policy of neutrality is ineffective. Three factors are important in the perception of a state's neutrality:

- The surrounding countries must trust the fact that the neutral state is in fact neutral and that it will remain so;
- The neutral state must be able to defend against attacks on its territory.
- The neutral state must not offer, by its strategic importance, decisive advantages for either of the opponents.

Part of this perception depends on a cost/benefit analysis. Rarely can a neutral state prevent occupation, but it can make the costs unacceptable. The attacker must compare the advantages of occupation, the cost of an offensive, the benefit of continued neutrality, and the risk if the opponent strikes first.

To achieve neutrality the nation state employs legal, political, economic, and military means. These means mainly concern the preparation for neutrality, the establishment of non-alignment status. The legal approach consists of treaties with neighbors, parts of the constitution of the neutral state, or laws passed by its parliament.<sup>55</sup> The neutral state must not politically, economically or militarily be committed to nor be dependent upon any of the belligerent parties.

Neutral countries in Europe have chosen different kinds of neutrality. For example, Switzerland chose to base its neutrality on treaties with its neighbors and to incorporate its neutral status into its constitution. In contrast, Sweden has no treaties with neighbors

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<sup>55</sup> Christina Patterson, "Neutrality and its Compatibility with the European Union: Comparative Case Studies of Austria, Finland, and Sweden" (Thesis, Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1994), 85.



and no legal obligation to follow the policy of neutrality; it is simply a declaration of intent.<sup>56</sup>

The closest definition of the Swedish form of neutrality is:

The legal status of a state during a war between other states whereby the states adopt an attitude of impartiality towards the belligerents that they recognize and which creates rights and duties under international law between the neutral state and the belligerents.<sup>57</sup>

The emergence of a bipolar world, shaped by two major military alliances after the Second World War, gave birth to the concept of non-alignment. The militarization of international relations during the Cold War era caused a number of states to adopt the term “non-alignment” to remain outside the struggle between the two sides. Non-alignment is a stance, a posture in relation to alliances in peacetime, taken by states that are not members of a military alliance. The posture bestows no rights or obligations under international law.<sup>58</sup> Non-alignment is normally a preparation for adopting the policy of neutrality, the link being credibility. Neutrality requires preparations during peacetime, since perceptions are important. One way to prepare is through non-alignment, even if peacetime relationships do not automatically lead to neutrality in war.

To summarize, neutrality, with rights, obligations and consequences, is a policy connected with war and international law. The nature of neutrality involves military actions and establishing hard security. Non-alignment, a peacetime concept, is a posture in relation to military alliances and is often a long-term preparation to facilitate the declaration of neutrality should conflict arise.

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 85.

<sup>57</sup> Efraim Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States* (London: Routledge, 1988), 18

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 28.

## The Traditional Policy

The most commonly used phrase, both by Swedish politicians and among the public, to describe Swedish security policy is: non-alignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war.<sup>59</sup> The term “security policy” normally consists of an aim together with measures or methods to achieve that aim. To achieve that aim a nation uses the various instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. The Swedish concept of security policy has traditionally concentrated on foreign policy and defense policy. The government resolutions on defense of 1989/90 and 1991/92 state that: “The security policy is essentially formed in the interaction between foreign and defense policy”<sup>60</sup>

With neutrality as its cornerstone, assistance to third world countries and support for disarmament in Europe dominated Sweden’s policy during the Cold War. Sweden’s desire to maintain a global perspective resulted in substantial aid to underdeveloped countries and a strong commitment to the UN. In contrast to some of the aid programs, all Swedish military operations abroad were under UN mandate. Sweden only took sides on behalf of the UN. Swedish support for European security policy was limited to participation in the CSCE/OSCE, in confidence-building activities on the divided continent, and in disarmament discussions.

As mentioned before, only a declaration of intent has formed the basis of Sweden’s neutrality. No agreement with neighbors or major powers has secured the policy, instead the Swedish Government unilaterally is to declare neutrality if war approaches. The policy has never been part of the constitution, nor has it received formal recognition

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<sup>59</sup> Wilhelm Agrell, Alliansfri – Tills Vidare (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1994), 19.

<sup>60</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1989/90:100 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1989).  
Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1991/92:102 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1991).

under the auspices of international law.<sup>61</sup> Over time, Swedish neutrality has passed from being an ad hoc, or temporary, policy to being accepted by the international community as a “continuous, conventional neutrality without an international legal basis.” This type of neutrality gives Sweden considerable formal freedom of action. A single government decision can alter Swedish neutrality/non-alignment since there are no legal or constitutional restrictions nor any international agreements.

The Swedish kind of neutrality reinforces the need for a consistent foreign policy and a strong defense. Because of this, Sweden has made considerable investments in the defense of the nation. A strong defense supported the policy of neutrality until the 1970s. After that, the armed force’s share of the Gross National Product (GNP) has fallen from approximately five percent to two percent.<sup>62</sup> Reductions have not affected the Swedish Air Force to any large extent and the national aviation industry is continuing to build fighter jets. Swedish politicians have always considered this ability, unique for a nation of only nine million inhabitants, as an expression of Sweden’s commitment to the policy of neutrality.

The influence from the policy of neutrality has had far reaching impact on foreign, trade, and defense policies. For example, neither military dispositions nor interoperability was to give the impression that easy integration into another party’s military structure was possible. Foreign or economic ties that would undermine neutrality were unacceptable, e.g. creating over-dependence on imports.<sup>63</sup> Consequently, security policy

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<sup>61</sup> Patterson, 42.

<sup>62</sup> Försvarsmakten, Försvarsmaktens underlag inför totalförsvarsbeslut 2000, (Stockholm: Högkvarteret, 1999).

<sup>63</sup> Agrell, 22.

often came into conflict with economic development. Sweden tried to balance requirements and chose to give priority to the security policy.

The single most important recent event within the area of Swedish security policy has been membership in the European Union. EU membership affects perceptions of Swedish neutrality. Strong forces within the EU want to transform it from an economic structure into an organization that also includes foreign and defense policy issues, an action that would cause a number of Eastern European states to perceive membership as an implicit security guarantee. Sweden recognized this as a dilemma and has had problems from the start with the compatibility of neutrality and CFSP. One solution to the problem has been to reduce the importance of the defense dimension. For example, in 1992 the Government of Sweden stated: "It should be noted that 'security policy' in the EU vocabulary does not automatically have a defense dimension."<sup>64</sup> Another approach was to describe CFSP as a slow process and to assert that nothing was decided yet.<sup>65</sup> The policy toward CFSP up until the late nineties has been to combine the element of slow process with a Swedish desire to remove common defense from the agenda. The description of the situation in 1995 was:

Many EU countries strive after a common defense, but the question has been put in the background. Sweden and other countries, on the other hand, have pursued a policy that the member states in an increasing degree shall be able to make decisions, within the so called Petersberg area, that can be carried out by a developed WEU.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup>Försvarsdepartementet, Säkerhets- och försvarspolitik. Särtryck ur 1992 års försvarsbeslutsproposition. (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1992).

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96:12 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1995).

Consequently, the Swedish policy has been to solve the dilemma by postponing it and in the meantime encouraging the development of an EU compatible with continued neutrality.

In summary, traditional Swedish security policy has been freely chosen, based on the declaration of intent to achieve basic national interests. Credibility for the policy has been established by investments in a strong national defense and consistent pursuit of a policy of non-alignment. The development of the security policy situation in Europe after the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as Swedish membership in the EU, has dramatically changed the situation.

## **The Evolution of the Policy**

### **The Official Policy**

A comparison between the four most recent Swedish resolutions on defense gives a good picture of the development of the official Swedish policy. The first decision came in the 1989-1990 time frame, before the end of the Cold War. The second resolution, made between 1991 and 1992, came at a turbulent period when future security arrangements in Europe were difficult to determine. The third determination, made in the period from 1995 to 1996 came at a time when Sweden had just joined EU and started cooperation with NATO in the Implementation Force/Stabilization Force (IFOR/SFOR) in former Yugoslavia. The fourth and most recent defense resolution occurred in the 1999-2000 period and reflects Sweden's position after having been a member of the EU for a number of years. Table 3 compares the four defense resolutions and tracks the policy evolution. The important changes are highlighted.

**Table 3: The Evolution of the Official Policy<sup>67</sup>**

Resolution 1989/90	1991/92	1995/96	1999/2000
The aim of the Swedish security policy is ultimately to preserve our country's freedom and independence	The aim of the Swedish security policy is ultimately to preserve our country's freedom and independence	The aim of the Swedish security policy is ultimately to preserve our country's freedom and independence	Sweden's security policy ultimately aims at preserving peace in our country and its independence.
The objective of our security policy is to be able, in all situations and in forms of our own choosing, to secure national freedom of action. This will make it possible, within our borders, to preserve and develop our society politically, economic, socially, and in all other aspects....	The objective of our security policy is to be able, in all situations and in forms of our own choosing- <b>as a single nation or in voluntary cooperation with other countries</b> - to develop our society politically, economic, socially, and in all other aspects	The objective of our security policy is to be able, in all situations and in forms of our own choosing to secure national freedom of action- <b>as a single nation and in cooperation</b> -to develop our society	Our security policy objectives are to ensure freedom of action in every situation and, in forms of our own choice, to be able to develop our society as an individual nation and <b>working together with others</b> .
The security policy is essentially formed in interaction between foreign and defense policy	The security policy is essentially formed in interaction between foreign and defense policy	<b>Our security policy has national and international dimensions that are formed in constant interaction between foreign and defense policy.</b>	Our security policy has both a national and an international dimension.
The main element of the security policy is neutrality, which means nonalignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war.	<b>Swedish security policy changes in a changing Europe. The new political situation creates new possibilities to participate in foreign and security policy cooperation with other European states. ..the hard core of the policy is nonalignment</b>	<b>Nonalignment is also in the changing Europe the best national security framework to achieve Swedish security interests. Our strive is to cooperate, concerning peace promoting, with all European security organizations</b>	<b>Freedom from military alliances does not create any obstacle, apart from agreements on mutual support in defence against armed aggression, to a comprehensive, active Swedish participation in international security cooperation. This also applies within the military field.</b>

The aim of the policy, to preserve freedom and independence, is practically unchanged through the period, though the means of achieving the aim arguably changes

<sup>67</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).  
Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96:12 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1995).  
Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1991/92:102 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1991).  
Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1989/90:37 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1989).

quite a bit. The most significant recent change is the wording between 1995/96 and 1999/2000 on non-alignment and military alliances. Going from the 1990 statement that “non-alignment is the best national security framework . . . ,” to the following quote from the most recent resolution, has to be viewed as a significant change:

For Sweden, participation in European co-operation and our contribution to common security-enhancing efforts and crisis management are also essential means of safeguarding our own security. Both civil and military resources should be used in this context. Sweden should act primarily within the framework of its membership in the EU, the UN, the OSCE, its status of observer in the WEU and its cooperation with NATO within the framework of the EAPC/PFP as well as in actual crisis-management efforts. In this way we can increase and strengthen our contribution to common-security enhancing activities and crisis management.

*An increased Swedish contribution to common security-enhancing activity and crisis management is fully compatible with Sweden’s non-participation in military alliances, since the co-operation does not involve defence guarantees in the event of armed attack (emphasis added).*<sup>68</sup>

As mentioned before, perhaps the most important underlying reason for these changes is the series of developments within EU security policy.

The Swedish policy of “wait and see” arguably suffered a set-back with the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. Its declarations mean that crisis management is now included in the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. At the meeting of the European Council in Cologne in June 1999, the member states undertook to develop more effective European resources and mechanisms for crisis management. The Amsterdam Treaty does not exclude the possibility of a future common European defence.<sup>69</sup> Should that occur, Swedish non-alignment and claims for neutrality will definitely be destroyed.

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<sup>68</sup> Regeringen, *Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30* (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).

<sup>69</sup> The Amsterdam Treaty: a Comprehensive Guide; available from <http://www.europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/a19000.htm>; Internet; accessed January 23 2001.

## **The Public Opinion**

To better understand Swedish security policy and its tendency to change, or in some cases tendency not to change, it is necessary to examine Swedish public opinion. Two sources illuminate the question: the political debate among the elite, and mainstream public opinion. As mentioned earlier, the Swedes' perception of themselves as a sovereign and neutral nation is deeply rooted in the public mind. This perception has found expression not only in the area of security policy, but also in other areas of international cooperation.

In the 1994 referendum for EU membership, those in support of membership consisted of all political parties except the Socialist Party and the Green Party (the Environmentalists). The "yes-side" was also heavily backed by Swedish industrial and economic forces, resulting in a huge advantage in advertising and propaganda resources before the referendum. The parties in support of EU membership would normally gather between eighty and eighty-five percent of the votes in a typical parliamentary election. In the referendum, the "yes-side" won by a mere two percent margin.<sup>70</sup> Polls taken after the referendum also showed increased public resistance against EU membership, sixty-one percent against in a poll from 1999.<sup>71</sup>

If the EU in the Swedish public mind symbolizes international social and economic cooperation, then NATO is the symbol for defense and security policy cooperation. Only two political parties in Sweden, the Conservative Party and the Liberal Party, favor NATO membership, if not immediate then membership at some future date. The most

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<sup>70</sup> "Svenskarnas motstånd mot NATO växer," Svenska Dagbladet, 19 January 1998, 4.

<sup>71</sup> "Massiv opinion mot NATO." Dagens Nyheter, 13 February 1999, 5.



recent public poll shows sixty-two percent in favor of continued non-alignment while twenty-four percent favors membership in NATO.<sup>72</sup>

The Swedish public was very hesitant about being brought into the European Union in the first place; it was very much a case of the political elite dragging the people with them. The Swedish decision not to join the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a sign of the political leadership being aware of public reluctance. Given these facts, and the clear hesitance towards membership in NATO, it is safe to assume that the Swedish political leadership will have a hard time explaining to the Swedish public any increased security policy cooperation within the EU.

### **The Development of the Armed Forces**

The changes in the European environment and the consequent changes in Swedish security policy have had major impact on the structure and size of the Swedish military organization. The table below shows the development of the size of the Swedish Armed Forces since 1989.

**Table 4: Development of the Swedish Armed Forces<sup>73</sup>**

	<b>Resolution on Defence 1989</b>	<b>Resolution on Defence 1991</b>	<b>Resolution on Defence 1995</b>	<b>Resolution on Defence 1999</b>
Army Brigades	27	16	13	6
Rapid Reaction Battalion	0	0	1	2
Navy Surface Squadrons	7	3	2	2
Submarines	14	12	9	5
Air Force Squadrons	23	20	12	8

<sup>72</sup> "Svenskar kan tänka sig yrkesarmé." *Aftonbladet*, 7 November 2000.

<sup>73</sup> Försvarmakten, *Facts and figures on the Swedish Armed Forces*, (Lidöping: Grunditz & Forsberg, 1999).

The table shows the shift in emphasis from a defense force prepared to meet an invasion, to an organization designed to be the nucleus for the maintenance and development of warfighting competencies. The creation of Rapid Reaction Battalions is an expression of the government's wish to enhance the ability of the Armed Forces to react to international demands for peace support forces. This should be viewed in the context of the widened scope of Swedish security policy.

Not just the size of the force has changed over the last decade. The widened scope of Swedish security policy, with increased emphasis on international military engagement, has also had an impact on the tasks of the Armed Forces. In the 1986 Resolution on Defense, the tasks are heavily concentrated on the defense of the territory within the framework of a larger conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the 1996 Resolution on Defense, the emphasis has gone through a significant change. The task to actually defend the country against armed attack is removed. Instead, the Armed Forces have the following four primary tasks:

1. The Armed Forces are to prepare in peacetime to defend the country in war against armed attack that threatens its liberty and independence. It must be possible to counterattack from any quarter and to defend the entire country.
2. The Armed Forces must be able to monitor and assert the country's territorial integrity in peacetime and in war, in the air, at sea and on land.
3. The Armed forces must be able to make trained units and other resources available for international peace support and humanitarian missions.
4. The Armed Forces must be able to support the community continually in times of severe strains on society in peacetime.<sup>74</sup>

Although all four tasks are considered primary tasks, numbers one and three are the ones that form the basis of the design of the Force.

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<sup>74</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1995/96:12 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1995)

## Summary

Since the late eighties, Sweden has gone from an almost “isolationist” nation concerning international cooperation in the security policy area to an active member and proponent of interoperability issues in a number of security policy organizations. It is important to note that the Swedish willingness to cooperate internationally is strictly limited to areas such as security and confidence-building measures, humanitarian and peace support operations, and disarmament in Europe. Questions about defense alliances, or common defense, are still inappropriate according to official policy. With the deepening cooperation and participation in the EU, the line is being blurred between social and economic cooperation and alliances in the area of security policy. The situation poses a mounting problem for the Swedish government, wanting one but not the other. The Swedish desire to maintain sovereignty when it comes to defense-related matters is becoming more and more problematic. The desire to maintain the traditional policy of non-alignment emanates from a deep public belief in the concept, a belief that also made entry into the EU a difficult battle for the supporters of that organization.

During the period discussed above, the Swedish Armed Forces have also been drastically reduced and given new tasks. The transformation has been fully justified by the changes in the surrounding European environment. Such dramatic changes could undermine any pretence of non-alignment by causing doubts when it comes to the ability of Sweden to defend its territory in case of a conflict in Northern Europe.

## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

*The ability of nations to join forces to subdue armed conflicts and alleviate human suffering is an important aspect of the new security situation in Europe and the world. It requires that respect for international law, including human rights, is maintained. Swedish participation in efforts to enhance common security and crisis management is also a means of safeguarding our own security.*<sup>75</sup>

1999/2000 Resolution on Defense.

The scope of this paper is to answer the question whether Swedish membership in, and interaction with, the major security policy organizations in Europe is consistent with the traditional Swedish policy of non-alignment aimed at neutrality in war.

In the case of OSCE and PfP the answer is without any doubt yes. There is no development towards forming any structures within these organizations which would cause Sweden to have to reconsider its position. The following quote illustrates how Sweden views the roles of NATO, the EAPC, the PfP, and the OSCE:

The government sees a natural division of responsibilities between the EAPC and the OSCE. In EAPC the emphasis will be placed on military crisis action issues and the operational interaction both in exercises and in operations such as IFOR/SFOR.

From a security policy perspective, EAPC and PfP are important parts in the strive to build a common security regime without creating new dividing lines while overcoming old ones. The EAPC will be an important forum for information gathering and consultations between NATO and

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<sup>75</sup> Regeringen, Regeringens proposition 1999/2000:30 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1999).

non-NATO nations. This encompasses a wide area ranging from overarching security policy issues to crisis management.

The OSCE is the central European instrument for conflict prevention and crisis management. The OSCE and the UN are the norm-setting organizations. The OSCE is also the central organization when it comes to issues of European disarmament.<sup>76</sup>

When it comes to the security policy implications of participation in the WEU and the EU, it is harder to find direct official quotes that outline Swedish views. Sweden is not a full member of the WEU so there is room for freedom of action. The question could be complicated with an integration of the WEU into the EU.

As shown earlier, the wording in the most recent Resolutions on Defense has clearly started to clear the way for increased cooperation in the security policy arena. Since Sweden has, more or less openly, adopted the policy of “wait and see” when it comes to security policy cooperation in the EU, there is a clear possibility that the Swedish policy of non-alignment will be overcome by events. If current trends in the security policy arena continue, the development of the EU into an organization with a mutual defense program is likely. With the economic implications that come with EU membership it is very difficult to see Sweden leaving that organization as a result of deepened cooperation in the field of defense and security policy.

As stated earlier, some generic factors are vitally important in the perception of a state's neutrality.

1. The neutral state must not offer, by its strategic importance, decisive advantages for either of the opponents.
2. The neutral state must be able to defend against attacks on its territory.
3. The neutral state must not politically, economically or militarily be committed to, nor be dependent upon, any of the belligerent parties.

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<sup>76</sup> Försvarsdepartementet, Euro-atlantiska partnerskapsrådet och det fördjupade Partnerskap för fred-samarbetet. (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 1997).

As for the first factor, Sweden's strategic importance was a major issue during the Cold War. Though situated in the outskirts of Europe, Sweden was considered of major strategic importance to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The first reason for this was its key position on the avenues of approach towards the ports in northern Norway. These ports were vital for NATO's effort to keep the trans Atlantic link open. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, wanted to sever the communications between Europe and North America. A study of the map of northern Scandinavia shows that a Warsaw Pact land offensive to reach the Norwegian coast would inevitably involve transiting Swedish territory. On the NATO side, offensive operations against Soviet Union territory would have been greatly facilitated if long range air assets could have been based in southern Sweden. With the fall of the Warsaw Pact the strategic importance of Sweden has diminished, or even disappeared completely.

As for Sweden's ability to defend itself against attacks on its territory, the development of the armed forces during the last decade tells its own tale. With the number of army brigades reduced from twenty-seven to six, and air force squadrons down from twenty-three to eight, Sweden does not have the capability to defend all its vast territory. Since the threat of armed aggression against the country, as well as its strategic importance, has mostly disappeared, the development is fully logical. However, when looking at these reductions from the perspective of supporting a credible policy of non-alignment and neutrality, the development is more questionable. The official view that the absence of an immediate threat will allow Sweden to rearm, should the situation change, sounds rather hollow.

The final factor also raises some questions in the event of a war involving Europe. Since Sweden is a full member of the EU, she would have intimate political and economic ties to at least one of the belligerents, unless a major war between the U.S. and Russia, without NATO involvement, is envisioned.

The conclusion of this argument has to be that Sweden's traditional policy of non-alignment and neutrality has little relevance in the current security policy situation. Throughout the cold war the policy made perfect sense to nations like Sweden, Finland and Austria since the security policy situation was clearly bipolar. Non-alignment was aimed at maintaining separation from NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and neutrality was to be declared in case of a major conflict between the two. Today the bipolar, stable situation is gone, and the threat is not a war between super powers but rather the menace of smaller scale contingencies like the Balkans. Is it possible, or desirable, for a modern western European nation to be neutral to such conflicts? The answer is clearly no, with the standpoint being backed by the fact that all "former neutral" European states, including Switzerland, have troops in Kosovo and/or in Bosnia.

If the policy of neutrality and non-alignment makes little sense in today's situation in Europe, why is Sweden still pursuing that policy? As described earlier, the Swedish policy of neutrality and non-alignment has very deep roots. Public opinion, demonstrated in continuing resistance against EU membership and continued strong support for a continuation of an independent Swedish security and defense policy, is a strong factor in Swedish politics. The major basis for this sentiment is the link between non-alignment/neutrality and sovereignty. Swedes in general view the emerging common defense and security policy within the EU, as well as policies like the EMU, as threats

against Swedish national sovereignty. This then appears to be the core of the matter: the stubborn Swedish continuation of its traditional non-alignment policy is not an end in itself, but rather a means to maintain national sovereignty. Should this assessment be accurate, the much bigger question arises as to whether membership in the EU is consistent with the core values of the Swedish people. The answer to that question is, however, outside the scope of this paper.



## Appendix A

### The European Security Structure

#### Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe (OSCE)

Bosnia and Herzegovina   Liechtenstein   Malta   Monaco   San Marino   Tajikistan   Vatican City  
Yugoslavia

#### Partnership for Peace (PfP)

Albania	Cyprus	Lithuania <sup>2</sup>	Turkmenistan
Andorra	Estonia <sup>2</sup>	Moldova	Ukraine
Armenia	FYROM	Romania <sup>2</sup>	Uzbekistan
Azerbaijan	Georgia	Russia	
Belarus	Kazakhstan	Slovakia <sup>2</sup>	
Bulgaria <sup>2</sup>	Kyrgyzstan	Slovenia <sup>2</sup>	
Croatia	Latvia <sup>2</sup>	Switzerland	

#### European Union (EU)

Austria <sup>1</sup>   Finland <sup>1</sup>  
Ireland <sup>1</sup>   Sweden <sup>1</sup>

#### NATO

Canada	Norway <sup>2</sup>
Czech Republic <sup>2</sup>	Poland <sup>2</sup>
Hungary <sup>2</sup>	Turkey <sup>2</sup>
Iceland <sup>2</sup>	USA

Denmark <sup>1</sup>

#### Western European Union (WEU)

Belgium	Italy	
France	Luxembourg	Spain
Germany	Netherlands	United Kingdom
Greece	Portugal	

1) Observer in Western European Union

2) Associate member of Western European Union

## *Glossary*

CEPD	NATO's Civilian Emergency Planning Directorate
CFE	Treaty on Conventional Forces Armed Forces in Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CNAD	NATO Conference of National Armament Directors
COEC	NATO Council Operations and Exercise Committee
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CHODs	Chiefs of Defense
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EADRRRC	Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre
EEC	European Economic Community
EC	European Community
ECSC	The European Coal and Steel Community
EMOP	The Enhanced and More Operational Partnership
EU	European Union
Euratom	European Atomic Energy Community
EUMC	The Military Committee (EU)
EUMS	The Military Staff (EU)
FAWEU	Forces answerable to WEU
IPP	Individual Partnership Programme
LIVEX	Live Exercise
MAS	Military Agency for Standardization (NATO)
MCWG	Military Cooperation Working Group
MILREPs	Military representatives (EU)
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
OCC	Operational Capability Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process

PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee (PfP)
PSC	Standing Political and Security Committee (EU)
PSE	Partner Staff Element (PfP)
PWP	Partnership Work Programme
RTO	Research and Technology Organization (NATO)
UN	United Nations
SWEDINT	Swedish Armed Forces International Command
TEEP	Training and Education Enhancement Programme
WEAG	Western European Armament Group
WEU	Western European Union

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